In the beginning, we don’t get to choose how our lives play out. The traits we have and the world around us are simply out of our control. Some are born into families with unfathomable wealth and others into poverty. Some are born with natural talents and others with genetic disorders. Naturally, those who are born with such disadvantages are usually worse off. The question is: is this unjust? Whether society should have a duty towards compensating these inequalities or whether a system like this would be absurd, is something I will explore throughout this essay. It is important to note that the ideas behind this topic can be quite complex and conceptually difficult, however this essay attempts to simplify these ideas into a much more condensed and comprehensive version, allowing us all to develop our own thoughts and opinions. 

The initial idea of justice for bad luck is credited to John Rawls, a 20th Century Political Philosopher who argued that inequalities resulting from arbitrary or unchosen circumstances are morally unfair and should be mitigated by the basic structure of society. His book, ‘A Theory of Justice’ (1971) classifies these morally arbitrary circumstances into two main areas: the natural lottery (biological traits such as health or intelligence) and the social lottery (social and economic circumstances). Rawls believes that because these factors are unearned, they should not determine a person's life prospects and justice requires society to compensate for these disadvantages. Although, I won't explicitly explore Rawls much further, his notion serves as the underlying foundation for this essay. Instead, I will delve into an argument from Ronald Dworkin, another 20th Century philosopher, who posited a system which could be used in order to compensate for what he defines as ‘brute luck’: a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles (What is Equality?, 1981). 

Dworkin introduces the example of a desert island auction to serve as a foundational model for initial equality where shipwrecked survivors must divide resources fairly to satisfy the envy test (no one prefers to choose another person’s bundle of resources). People can then go out and choose whether to, for example, fish in dangerous waters to catch more food, if they fail that is option luck - they choose to take that risk. This is fair equality for Dworkin. However if other survivors are suddenly struck by lightning or are naturally more strong and productive, this is brute luck. This is unjust as they affect someone’s circumstances rather than their chosen ambitions, so is unfair inequality. Exploring Dworkin’s example of the desert island, allowed me to construct an outline for his argument which aligns closely with my view: a society that ignores brute luck disadvantages allows unearned luck to influence the outcomes of lives, which directly contrasts fairness. Justice must not only observe inequalities, but actively correct those caused by arbitrary circumstances. 

The rationale behind this argument can be displayed as follows: 

1. Inequalities arise from arbitrary factors beyond responsible control

This premise can be substantiated by considering how brute luck is, by definition, independent of conscious or logical decision making. For instance, our social class is morally arbitrary and not the result of deliberate choice. Therefore, these factors are imposed rather than chosen by individuals so we cannot influence or prevent them. 

2. If so, then we need a system of compensation 

Dworkin posits the use of a hypothetical insurance market to compensate for unchosen brute luck. If everyone had the chance to insure themselves against disadvantages, they would choose for protection against brute luck. By parity of reasoning, justice requires society to provide a real world mechanism to compensate for them. The goal of egalitarian justice is to ensure that brute luck does not influence life prospects. Therefore, justice requires mitigating the effects of this misfortune. 

3. So we need a system of compensation 

The cogency of this argument can be illuminated through G.A. Cohen who posits that natural endowments are morally arbitrary, yet they heavily influence a person’s life prospects (On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 1989). To illustrate, one person may be born into extreme wealth and have extraordinary talent whereas another may be born into poverty with genetic disadvantages. Since these outcomes are not chosen, Cohen contends that any theory of justice that allows such disparities to persist, fails to treat people as equal and therefore are unjust. 

However, Elizabeth Anderson raises many criticisms in her book ‘What is the Point of Equality’, 1993. She would argue that although it is unjust to be worse off due to social oppression, our main job is not to fix natural bad luck like Dworkin suggests. She believes that by trying to neutralise bad luck, it becomes intrusive and disrespectful. Instead, we should focus on ensuring everyone can function as equal in society, no matter their luck. Anderson argues that recent egalitarian theory has become obsessed with compensating people for brute luck, which she contends is a flawed goal. 

Grounds for her contention are as follows: 

1. Luck egalitarian justice systems allow people to be left off worse for their imprudent choices 

This premise is plausible by considering Anderson’s two main critiques: harshness toward option luck and disrespect towards brute luck victims. Individuals are entitled to compensation for disadvantages arising from brute luck but not those resulting from voluntary risks. As a result, people who suffer from imprudent choices may be left worse off without assistance. 

2. If so, then those systems are harsh or humiliating 

This can be substantiated through Anderson’s critique that egalitarianism can lead to the ‘abandonment of negligent victims’. Luck egalitarians believe that if you choose a risk and lose then you have no claim for help. For instance, consider an uninsured driver who

negligently makes an illegal turn which causes a car accident. The driver is left to die at the side of the road by emergency paramedics as they find out he was uninsured. According to the Dworkinian framework, it is not unjust for the driver to be worse off because their situation resulted from their own voluntary choices and foreseeable risks - driving a car and driving a car without insurance. Such practices risk portraying individuals as responsible for their suffering and therefore less deserving of aid which undermines that people should all be treated with equal respect. 

3. So, luck egalitarianism can be harsh or humiliating 

This is a prima facie worrying objection as Anderson argues that helping with victims of brute luck is demeaning and humiliating. She raises the new consideration that by basing aid on pity, people are illuminated as inferior or pitiable which creates a ‘poor law’ mentality, separating the ‘deserving’ from ‘undeserving’. Therefore, luck egalitarianism loses sight of the true point of equality: creating a compassionate community where no one is abandoned. 

Whilst Anderson argues that luck egalitarianism can lead to harsh or humiliating outcomes, this objection targets an overly strict interpretation of Dworkin’s theory rather than its core principle that brute luck should be compensated. Luck egalitarianism does not require abandoning or humiliating brute luck victims but instead can incorporate safeguards which preserve equal respect while still compensating for brute luck. For example, many systems already provide unconditional assistance for emergency situations: paramedics help injured individuals regardless of whether their injuries occurred through reckless behaviour. This demonstrates that a system can maintain a baseline of aid and still hold people responsible for certain choices. Therefore, this avoids the harsh outcomes that Anderson critiques as a system can still differentiate brute luck and option luck in contexts where it is less urgent. 

Even if luck egalitarianism aims to correct for brute luck, Cohen argues that the distinction between brute and option luck is unstable because individuals’ choices themselves are shaped by factors beyond their control. Cohen performs an immanent critique of Dworkin’s theory, by accepting Dworkin’s goal of neutralising brute luck but arguing that Dworkin’s own rules (the equality of resources) fail to achieve it. 

1. The goal of egalitarian justice is to eliminate the influence of brute luck

Both Dworkin and Cohen agree on this. Dworkin’s theory is designed to be endowment-insensitive, so natural luck such as being born with a handicap shouldn't make you worse off. Cohen calls this ‘the primary egalitarian impulse’. 

2. If so, then individuals must be compensated for involuntary expensive tastes

Dworkin draws a cut between resources and tastes. He argues that tastes are part of the ‘person’ and their ‘ambitions’, so individuals must take responsibility for them, even if they didn't choose them in a simple way. However, Cohen argues Dworkin’s cut is arbitrary. To illustrate this, he uses the example of Paul, who has an involuntary taste for photography. If photography is expensive due to the desires and needs of other people (market luck), and Paul cannot help his preference, then Paul is suffering from bad brute luck. Cohen concludes that if we really want to eliminate brute luck, we must compensate for these ‘welfare deficits’ 

3. So individuals must be compensated for involuntary expensive tastes 

This is a strong objection to Dworkin as it functions as a reductio ad absurdum. By applying Dworkin’s own commitment to neutralising brute luck consistently, Cohen shows that individuals with involuntary expensive tastes should also be compensated. However, Dworkin rejects such compensation, which reveals a tension within his framework. If the egalitarian aim of justice is truly about neutralising luck, it must move toward Cohen’s ‘equal access to advantage’, which compensates anyone who is disadvantaged through no fault of their own, whether that disadvantage is a lack of ‘clamshells’ or an involuntary expensive taste. 

In rebuttal to Cohen, Dworkin emphasises that the distinction between resources and tastes is not arbitrary but depicts a deeper commitment to respecting individuals as responsible agents. Cohen treats unchosen expensive tastes as a form of brute luck that needs to be compensated but Dworkin argues that such tastes form a part of a person's identity. Therefore, a just system must also be ambition sensitive - requiring individuals to bear the costs of pursuing their ambitions rather than transferring those costs to others. If all expensive tastes were compensated, people would be treated as ‘carriers of desires’ whose preferences need to be satisfied. Dworkin’s framework respects individuals as responsible agents who must consider the real cost of their ambitions. 

In conclusion, although Dworkin’s framework faces many criticisms, the core of his argument still stands. Namely that we as a society should focus on compensating victims of brute luck under egalitarian laws of justice.